Since the 1970s, partisan polarization has increased dramatically in the electorate as well as in Congress and this development has had important consequences for Senate elections. The electoral coalitions supporting Democratic and Republican Senate candidates have become increasingly distinct in terms of race and ideology which has led to increased party loyalty and straight ticket voting. Senate elections have also become increasingly nationalized with voters basing their decisions on their evaluation of the president's performance. The proportion of states that tilt strongly toward one party has increased substantially with the South becoming a strongly Republican region and the Northeast becoming a strongly Democratic region. There are fewer competitive Senate races but the relatively close balance of power between the parties in the nation and the strong influence of national issues on voters have contributed to larger seat swings and more frequent turnover in party control of the Senate. The current 60-seat Democratic majority is the largest for either party since the 1970s. The results of the 2010 and 2012 elections will indicate whether this development signals the emergence of a stable Democratic majority or whether it is a short-term phenomenon based on voter disillusionment with the Bush Administration.
1
The rise of ideological polarization in the U.S. Congress over the past several decades has been well documented by scholars (Rohde 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Fleisher and Bond 2004; Poole 2005; Smith and Gamm 2005; Sinclair 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 2007) . In both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the ideological divide between the parties has widened dramatically: the Democratic Party has moved steadily to the left since the 1970s while the Republican Party has moved steadily to the right. Conservative The evidence displayed in Table 1 shows that the ideological polarization that characterizes the 111 th Senate represents a dramatic change from the situation that existed 40 years ago. In the 91st th Senate (1969-71) , moderates made up 41 percent of the members while strong liberals and conservatives made up only 22 percent. 2 In contrast, in today's Senate, moderates make up only 5 percent of the members while strong liberals and conservatives make up 49 percent.
Although both parties have contributed to increased polarization, the movement away from the center has been greater on the Republican side than on the Democratic side. Between the 91 st Senate and the 111 th Senate, the proportion of Democratic senators classified as moderates fell from 36 percent to 5 percent while the proportion classified as strong liberals rose from 22 percent to 43 percent. Over the same time period, the proportion of Republican senators classified as moderates fell from 48 percent to 5 percent while the proportion classified as strong conservatives rose from 21 percent to 55 percent.
[ Table 1 goes here]
The rise of ideological polarization has had important consequences for the legislative process in both chambers of Congress, making bipartisan cooperation increasingly difficult and strengthening the hand of party leaders (Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Smith and Gamm 2005) . But the consequences of polarization have been greater in some ways for the Senate than for the House because the House has traditionally operated in a much more partisan fashion than the Senate. In the House of Representatives, the rules governing debate and floor voting have long given crucial advantages to the leaders of the majority party. And increasing polarization may make it easier for leaders of the majority party to keep their own members unified on the floor 2 Senators with NOMINATE scores below -.5 were classified as strong conservatives, those with scores between -.5 and -.2 were classified as conservatives, those with scores between -.2 and +.2 were classified as moderates, those with scores between .2 and .5 were classified as liberals, and those with scores of .5 or higher were classified as strong liberals.
since there are now fewer ideological outliers to persuade (Schickler and Pearson 2005) . In the Senate, however, reliance on unanimous consent agreements and the filibuster rule have provided the minority party with much greater influence (Evans and Lipinski 2005) . For most purposes it takes 60 votes to pass legislation and this usually requires both near unanimity within the majority party and at least a few votes from members of the minority party. As we have seen in the first few months of the 111 th Congress, this has become a very difficult task requiring delicate negotiations between the majority party leadership and a handful of moderates in both parties who hold the balance of power.
Polarization in the Electorate
While scholars generally agree about the importance of increasing partisan polarization in Congress, there has been much less agreement on the extent and significance of polarization in the American electorate. The central argument of this paper is that polarization is not just an elite phenomenon. I will present evidence that over the past several decades there has been a substantial increase in polarization in the electorate and that this has had important consequences for Senate elections and for the relationship between senators and their constituents.
Four major trends have affected Senate elections in the past thirty years as a direct result of growing partisan polarization within the electorate. First, the parties' electoral coalitions have become increasingly distinct both racially and ideologically. The nonwhite share of the U.S.
electorate has doubled since the early 1990s, reaching a record 26 percent in 2008, and this trend is almost certain to continue based on the racial make-up of the youngest and oldest age groups in the population. However, due to the overwhelming preference of nonwhite voters for the Democratic Party, the growth of the nonwhite electorate has led to an increasing racial divide between the Democratic and Republican electoral coalitions. At the same time, the parties' electoral coalitions have become increasingly distinct ideologically as a result of a gradual ideological realignment within the electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998 A 2007 Census Bureau study shows that there is a dramatic difference between the racial composition of the oldest and youngest age groups in the U.S. population. According to the Census Bureau, Non-Hispanic whites make up almost 81 percent of Americans over the age of 65 but less than 60 percent of those under the age of 18. In contrast, African-Americans make up more than15 percent of the population under the age of 18 compared with only 8 percent of the population over the age of 65 and Hispanics make up more than 20 percent of the population under the age of 18 and almost 24 percent of the population under the age of 5, compared with less than 7 percent of the population over the age of 65. While the nonwhite share of the electorate will probably continue to lag behind the nonwhite share of the population due to lower citizenship and turnout rates, these data indicate that we can expect the nonwhite share of the U.S. electorate to continue to grow for many years. It is also important to note that partisan polarization is greatest among the most politically engaged members of the public-those who care about politics, pay attention to what their elected representatives are doing, vote regularly, and engage in political activities beyond voting.
Thus, according to data from the 2008 ANES, the correlation between ideological identification and Senate vote was .30 for those whose political involvement was limited to voting, .58 for those who engage in one activity beyond voting, and .73 for those who engaged in at least two activities beyond voting.
Among Republican Senate voters, the average score on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale was 4.7 for those whose involvement was limited to voting, 5.2 for those who engaged in one activity beyond voting, and 5.6 for those who engaged in at least two activities beyond voting; among Democratic Senate voters, the average score was 3.8 for those whose involvement was limited to voting, 3.4 for those who engaged in one activity beyond voting, and 2.9 for those who engaged in at least two activities beyond voting. The most politically engaged Republican voters were much more conservative than those who were less politically engaged while the most politically engaged Democratic voters were much more liberal than those who were less politically engaged. And it is the engaged partisans whose preferences are of greatest concern to candidates and elected officials including U.S. senators.
The Decline and Resurgence of Partisanship
Since the 1970s, the growing racial and ideological divisions between supporters of the two parties have contributed to a marked increase in partisan voting in Senate elections. Far fewer voters feel cross-pressured by their ideological orientation and their party identification.
Therefore, far fewer are tempted to defect to the opposing party. This can be seen in Figure 4 which displays the trends in two measures of partisan voting, party loyalty and straight-ticket voting, between the 1950s and the first decade of the 21 st century.
[ Figure 4 goes here] [ Table 2 goes here]
The high degree of geographic polarization in 2008 is consistent with the pattern evident in other recent presidential elections, including the 2004 election, but it represents a dramatic change from the voting patterns of the 1960s and 1970s as the evidence in Table 2 demonstrates.
In the competitive 1960 and 1976 elections, for example, there were far more closely contested states and far fewer landslide states than in recent presidential elections. In 1960, 20 states were decided by less than 5 points and only 9 by more than 15 points; in 1976, 20 states were decided by less than 5 points and only 10 by more than 15 points.
The trends shown in Table 2 along with increasing party loyalty among voters clearly have important implications for Senate elections. As the number of states that strongly favor one party has increased and party loyalty has increased, we would expect to find an increase in the number of senators holding relatively safe seats and a corresponding decline in the number holding marginal or high-risk seats. And this is exactly what has happened according to the data displayed in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 goes here] -1976-1978, 1992-2000, and 2008 . States were classified as safe or solid if they gave at least 55 percent of the vote to the presidential candidate of a senator's party; they were classified as marginal if they gave between 45 and 55 percent of the vote to the presidential candidate of a senator's party, and they were classified as high risk if they gave less than 45 percent of the vote to the presidential candidate of a senator's party.
According to these data, there was only a modest increase in the proportion of senators whose states were classified as safe or solid for their party between the 1970s and the 1990s. Between the 1990s and 2008, however, the proportion of senators representing states that were classified as safe or solid for their party increased from 36 percent to 60 percent.
[ Table 4 goes here]
In the 111 th Congress, large majorities of Democrats and Republicans in both chambers represent states or districts in which their party is strongly advantaged. This can be seen in Table   4 
Competition in Senate Elections
Given the growing number of senators representing states in which their party is strongly advantaged, it is not surprising that there has been a marked decline in competition in Senate elections in recent years. [ Table 5 goes here]
Despite the decline in competition for individual Senate seats, however, competition for control of the Senate has actually increased in recent years. The data in Table 6 show that despite the decline in the number of competitive races, the average number of Senate seats switching parties has remained fairly stable since the 1960s except for a temporary bump during the 1970s. Meanwhile, the frequency of switches in party control of the Senate has actually increased over time. There were no switches in party control between 1962 and 1970, only one between 1972 and 1980 and between 1982 and 1990, but [ Table 6 But the narrower majorities of the past two decades are not the entire explanation for the greater frequency of switches in party control. Another factor contributing to increased competition for control of the Senate has been an increase in the average inter-party seat swing in elections. The data in Table 5 show that the average inter-party swing of 5 seats between 2002
and 2008 was higher than the average for any of the previous four decades. Even though the average number of seats switching party control has not been increasing, and was actually considerably larger during the 1970s, the data in Table 6 show that the average inter-party seat swing increased because the direction of these seat switches became more consistent. Between Increased uniformity in the direction of seat switches in recent years appears to reflect the growing influence of national issues on voting in Senate elections. As ideological differences between the two major parties have increased, it seems that voters have increasingly come to view individual House and Senate contests as referenda on the performance of the national parties. As a result, in choosing a candidate to represent their district or state they are increasingly influenced by their evaluation of the president's performance. This can be seen in Table 7 which displays the correlations between voters' evaluation of the president's job performance and their House and Senate votes over the past four decades, since the ANES began asking a presidential job performance question.
[ Table 7 goes here]
The data in Table 7 show that there has been a fairly dramatic increase in the influence of The influence of presidential evaluations on candidate choice appears to have been even stronger in some of the key Senate contests of 2006, the election in which Democrats gained six seats to take back control of the Senate. [ Table 8 goes here]
In 7 of these 8 contests, voters were presented with a choice between a moderately to very Republican tide. The data in Table 9 show that Democrats currently hold 11 Senate seats in states that were carried by the Republican Party in all three presidential elections since 2000 as well as 11 seats in states that were carried by the Republicans in two of these three elections. In contrast, Republicans only hold two seats in states that were carried by the Democratic Party in all three presidential elections and only two additional seats in states that were carried by the Democrats in two of these elections.
[ Based on the evidence presented in this paper, polarization is not going away any time soon and this has potentially important implications for the legislative process in the Senate.
Polarization is producing growing frustration among members of the majority party with Senate rules that allow the minority party to block or delay legislation. We have seen clear signs of this frustration in threats by Republican leaders to invoke the so-called "nuclear option" to prevent filibusters over judicial nominations during President Bush's second term and in discussions by
Democrats of the possibility of using the cumbersome reconciliation process to prevent a Republican filibuster of health care reform legislation in 2009. Given the deep ideological divide that separates the two parties today, a return to relatively narrow majorities in the future is likely to increase the level of frustration of members of the majority party as cloture becomes even more difficult to invoke. At some point, this may well lead to renewed efforts to change the Senate's rules to reduce the ability of the minority party to block legislation by making it easier to invoke cloture or to use floor procedures that prevent filibusters. 
